CITY — April 23, 2024 —
The European Union faces an energy paradox, publicly aiming to phase out russian gas by 2027 while privately many of its members still depend on this supply source. This reliance on Russian gas, despite stated commitments, stems from economic factors, namely cost, infrastructure constraints, and the challenge of achieving a unified political stance. This disparity between policy and practice is causing a “double game” behind the scenes. For a deeper understanding of the EU’s complex energy strategy,keep reading.
Here’s a rewritten version of the provided article, incorporating the requested elements and adhering to the instructions:
The EU’s Energy Paradox: Public Goals vs. Private Realities
Table of Contents
The European Union presents a united front on phasing out Russian gas, but a closer look reveals a more complex reality.While official policy aims for full energy independence by 2027, the continent’s energy needs and economic considerations are creating a “double game” behind the scenes.
The Official Stance
On paper, the EU is committed to ending its reliance on Russian gas.A ban on new contracts is set to take effect by 2025, supported by press releases, parliamentary votes, and the REPowerEU strategy. This public position aims to reduce President vladimir putin’s revenue streams and diminish Russia’s influence in the region [[3]].
The Underlying Reality
However, the truth is more nuanced: Europe wants Russian gas—it just doesn’t want to be seen wanting it.
several factors contribute to this discrepancy:
Cost: Liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. and Qatar is more expensive than Russian pipeline gas.
Infrastructure: The infrastructure for handling LNG is unevenly distributed across the EU.
Political unity: Achieving consensus among 27 member states on energy policy is challenging, especially when energy bills rise.
Key Players and Potential loopholes
Several EU members are poised to resume importing Russian gas if the possibility arises, notably if a U.S.-brokered peace deal includes the resumption of Russian pipeline gas.
Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria: These countries “never fully signed onto the EU’s energy morality play.” They are pragmatic, exposed to energy shortages, and already importing Russian gas via TurkStream. They are likely to sign new deals through loopholes, intermediaries, or with tacit approval from Washington.
Brussels’ Strategy: Sanitizing Russian Gas
According to the article, Brussels is aware of this situation. The goal is not to eliminate Russian gas entirely but to sanitize it—disguise the source, launder the contract chain, and let the energy flow while the political optics stay intact.
The Bottom Line
While the EU can technically refuse Russian gas, it is unlikely to do so. Cheap Russian gas, delivered through neutral-sounding brokers, remains the path of least resistance. This situation is described as geopolitical theater
rather than a genuine energy strategy.
Libya: Cracks in the Backdoor Agreements
The story of Arkenu Oil illustrates the backdoor deals that have been keeping the lid on the civil war pressure cooker. Arkenu has been exporting crude from the Haftar-controlled east since mid-2024, quietly raking in over $600 million outside Tripoli’s oversight. dbeibehis is under formal scrutiny for that deal. The scandal pulls back the curtain on a mutually beneficial arrangement: Tripoli gets continued oil flows,Benghazi gets money and legitimacy,and no one asks too many questions about who’s really in charge. Proceeds from Arkenu’s exports have reportedly bypassed Libya’s Central Bank and flowed through Geneva and Dubai.
Deals, Mergers & Acquisitions
Sunoco announced a $9.1 billion acquisition of Canadian fuel distributor Parkland, expanding its fuel and retail footprint across North America and the Caribbean.
I Squared Capital, alongside Enbridge and MPLX LP, is acquiring up to an 85% stake in the 580-mile Matterhorn express natural gas pipeline, valued at over $5 billion including debt.
Norway’s Equinor has agreed to sell a 60% operated interest in Brazil’s Peregrino oil field to PRIO SA (via its subsidiary Prio Tigris) for $3.5 billion.
Saudi Aramco and Nabors Industries are evaluating an IPO of Sanad Drilling, their 50:50 joint venture operating 50 rigs across Saudi Arabia.
Finding & Development
ExxonMobil has announced plans to invest $1.5B between Q2 2025 and 2027 to revitalize production at Nigeria’s Usan deepwater oilfield (offshore block OMi 138).
Beacon offshore Energy’s Shenandoah project is expected to achieve first oil in June 2025,while LLOG Exploration’s Salamanca development targets first production in August 2025.
Q1 Earnings Beat
The UAE’s state-controlled ADNOC Drilling reported a 24% rise in first-quarter 2025 profit to $341 million, driven by a 134% surge in oilfield services revenue.
murphy Oil (NYSE: MUR) posted Q1 earnings of $73M, down from $90M year-on-year, amid a softer pricing surroundings.
ExxonMobil reported Q1 earnings of $7.7B ($1.76/share), just exceeding analyst expectations of $1.75/share.
Chevron posted adjusted Q1 earnings of $3.8B ($2.18/share), pretty much on par with analyst expectations.
Shell’s Q1 adjusted earnings came in at $5.58B, compared to analyst expectations of $4.96B.
French TotalEnergies posted adjusted net income of $4.2B for Q1 ( down 18% YoY), missing analyst expectations of $4.3B, due to lower oil prices and refining margins, which were only partially offset by higher hydrocarbon output and gas prices.
FAQ Section
Is the EU truly phasing out Russian gas? The official policy states a phase-out by 2027, but economic realities and political considerations suggest a more complex situation.
Why are some EU countries still buying Russian gas? Cheaper prices, existing infrastructure, and a lack of unified political will contribute to continued reliance on russian gas.
What is Brussels’ strategy? The goal is to “sanitize” Russian gas by disguising its source and laundering the contract chain.
Which countries are most likely to continue importing Russian gas? Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria are the most likely candidates.
This rewritten article aims to provide a extensive and engaging overview of the EU’s energy situation, highlighting the gap between public policy and private realities.
